Fraud

Marcher Gets Close to Users by Targeting Mobile Banking, Android Apps, Social Media, and Email

Marcher targets focused on European, Australian, and Latin American banks, along with PayPal, eBay, Facebook, WhatsApp, Viber, Gmail, and Yahoo—all in the month of March.
April 07, 2017
11 min. read

Introduction

Marcher is an Android banking Trojan, first detected in 2013, that continually evolves to stay active. The longevity and evolution of this malware is not surprising, given that mobile banking malware is the quickest and easiest way to grab money from victims. In fact, the mobile banking malware market is so hot, it grew 400% in 2016, 81% of which targeted Android phones.1 That growth is somewhat expected since Android, with over 24,000 implementations, is the most popular smartphone operating system.2 That is a huge number of devices to test and secure, made more difficult by the fact that most Android phones are behind in critical patches and thus are more vulnerable to attack.3 As with any malware campaign, attackers must continually evolve to evade detection of their C&C servers and keep the cash flowing.

Marcher inspects its infected devices carefully by using a dedicated, hard-coded configuration in each Android Package Kit (APK), Google’s file format for distributing and installing application software (like mobile banking apps) on the Android OS. Each APK has the ability to target different financial institutions in specific geographical locations.

F5 research conducted in March 2017 followed 153 Marcher configuration files to uncover target and activity trends in the worldwide attack campaigns. Among the 153 configuration files, 54 distinct command and control (C&C) servers were detected. Of the 54 distinct C&C servers, 12 of them were online and operational (until F5 had them shut down in March), 10 were sink-holed, and 32 were already offline. The remaining 99 C&C servers were duplicated configurations from different APKs. This is likely due to configuration files being hardcoded within the APK, and old spam campaigns infecting different users, thus, old configurations still being detected in the wild.

 

Figure 1: Marcher configuration status (left) and status of distinct C&C servers (right) as of March 2017

Figure 1: Marcher configuration status (left) and status of distinct C&C servers (right) as of March 2017

Global View of March Targets

Analyzing the newest configuration files, Marcher’s March targets primarily focused on banks in Europe, followed by Australia, and then Latin America. Only 2% of targets were in North America. The targets within these regions were all banks, as well as their Android mobile banking apps available for download in the Google Play Store. Australia had one exception where an online classified ad site called Gumtree was targeted. The 7% “Global” are application and platform targets that are used worldwide such as the Android platform, social network companies like Facebook, email providers like Yahoo and Gmail, the WhatsApp and Viber messaging apps, PayPal, and eBay. (See target domain details driving these geographical breakdowns in the Marcher Targets section and Appendix A.)

 

Figure 2: Marcher targets by regions in March 2017

Figure 2: Marcher targets by regions in March 2017

 

The following map shows the specific countries within the regions above that were targeted. The banks within those countries are detailed in Appendix A.

 

Figure 3: Marcher-targeted countries, March 2017

Figure 3: Marcher-targeted countries, March 2017

Campaigns and Targets

The common pattern in the latest configuration was distinct and repeated subfolders in the C&C details, such as 012, THREEHADFOUND, or jadafire. We classified the current online campaigns via these subfolder identifications as follows:

  • 012 campaigns spanned different geolocations in one campaign targeting Germany, Poland, Austria, and Australia
  • jadafire campaigns target Austrian and German banks, as well as social network apps globally
  • MANUNIT campaigns targeting German banks specifically
  • balls51 campaigns target banks in Austria, Germany, Argentina, UK, Colombia, Peru, and Mexico
  • THREEHADFOUND campaigns targeting German banks specifically
  • MUCHTHENWERESTO campaigns targeting German and Czech Republic banks
  • moon campaigns targeting Australian banks specifically
  • TRUELESSCARBLAC campaigns target German and Austrian banks
  • angelkelly campaigns target banks in UK, Germany, and France
  • QUESTIONROADFAR campaigns target French banks as well as social network apps globally

C&C Servers Detected

In the following table, we’ve listed the 54 distinct C&C servers detected, 63% of which were using HTTPS. While monitoring Marcher activity in March, F5 researchers shut down 12 malicious C&C servers that were detected.

 

No. C&C Server Status
1 hxxp://stionguz.com/012/ Sinkholed
2 hxxp://asdhjfd24.ru/mail/ Offline
3 hxxp://propsyours.com/012 Sinkholed
4 hxxp://ausrusot.net/012 Sinkholed
5 hxxp://albumwink.net/012/ Sinkholed
6 hxxp://toddypross.net/012 Sinkholed
7 hxxp://aflyatok.men/012 Offline – shut down in March 2017 by F5 researchers
8 hxxp://samiy.site/012/ Offline – shut down in March 2017 by F5 researchers
9 hxxp://chaldear.com/012/ Sinkholed
10 hxxp://glennuniat.com/012/ Sinkholed
11 hxxp://joguce.info/012/ Offline – shut down in March 2017 by F5 researchers
12 hxxp://ciorrigh.info/012/ Offline – shut down in March 2017 by F5 researchers
13 hxxp://policywings.bid/012/ Offline – shut down in March 2017 by F5 researchers
14 hxxp://wigthsingls.bid/012/ Offline
15 hxxp://limesysleys.bid/012/ Offline – shut down in March 2017 by F5 researchers
16 hxxp://namessheds.bid/012/ Offline – shut down in March 2017 by F5 researchers
17 hxxp://bastebirk.com/012/ Sinkholed
18 hxxp://shapewhisk.com/012/ Sinkholed
19 hxxp://ahongdeash.net/012/ Sinkholed
20 hxxp://nsdas213123aa.ru/at/ Redirecting to RevDl.com
21 hxxps://soldatenccarmytriptheleader.at/jadafire/ Offline
22 hxxps://fisttheexo.at/jadafire/ Offline
23 hxxps://soldatenccarmythegaynation.at/jadafire/ Offline
24 hxxps://soldatenccarmy.at/jadafire/ Offline
25 hxxps://exofisty.at/jadafire/ Offline
26 hxxps://soldatenccarmygoldenshower.at/jadafire/ Offline
27 hxxps://consulting-center-performace.com/MANYUNIT/ Offline
28 hxxps://grapfix-desgin-ltd24.at/MANYUNIT/ Offline
29 hxxps://service-consultiong-ltd-spain.net/MANYUNIT/ Offline
30 hxxps://soulreaver.at/balls51/ Offline – shut down in March 2017 by F5 researchers
31 hxxps://divingforpearls.at/balls51/ Offline
32 hxxps://olimpogods.at/balls51/ Offline
33 hxxps://176.119.28.74/balls51/ Offline – shut down in March 2017 by F5 researchers
34 hxxps://nvah2p123.org/THREEHADFOUND/ Offline
35 hxxps://nvoa324.net/THREEHADFOUND/ Offline
36 hxxps://brkleo34.org/THREEHADFOUND/" Offline
37 hxxps://app01.at/MUCHTHENWERESTO/ Offline
38 hxxps://app12.at/MUCHTHENWERESTO/ Offline
39 hxxps://ap11.at/MUCHTHENWERESTO/ Offline
40 hxxps://droidgrades.top/moon/ Offline – 404
41 hxxps://droidgrades.us/moon/ Offline – 404
42 hxxps://droidsg.pw/moon/ Offline – 404
43 hxxps://wasdashehe.net/TRUELESSCARBLAC/ Offline – shut down in March 2017 by F5 researchers
44 hxxps://wasdashehe.at/TRUELESSCARBLAC/ Offline – shut down in March 2017 by F5 researchers
45 hxxps://wasdashehe.com/TRUELESSCARBLAC/ Offline – shut down in March 2017 by F5 researchers
46 hxxp://45.32.240.33/1f/l/ Offline
47 hxxps://track-google.at/angelkelly/ Offline – 404
48 hxxps://trackgoogle.at/angelkelly/ Offline – 404
49 hxxps://secure-ingdirect.top/QUESTIONROADFAR/ Offline
50 hxxps://playsstore.net/QUESTIONROADFAR/ Offline
51 hxxps://playsstore.mobi/QUESTIONROADFAR/ Offline
52 hxxps://i-app4.online/MUCHTHENWERESTO/ Offline
53 hxxps://i-app5.online/MUCHTHENWERESTO/ Offline
54 hxxps://i-app1.online/MUCHTHENWERESTO/ Offline
Table 1: C&C servers and their statuses, March 2017

 

The 12 C&C servers that F5 shut down in March were associated with three campaigns—012, balls51, and TRUELESSCARBLAC—that primarily targeted banks in Europe. 012 was the most active campaign targeting German, Polish, Austrian, and Australian banks, followed by TRUELESSCARBLAC that also targeted German and Polish banks. The balls51 campaign targeted Austrian, German, and UK banks, as well as Latin American banks in Mexico, Argentina, Colombia, and Peru.

 

Figure 4: 12 Marcher campaigns running on 12 active C&C servers taken down in March 2017

Figure 4: 12 Marcher campaigns running on 12 active C&C servers taken down in March 2017
 

Marcher Targets

We detected 172 targeted domains in March 2017. As expected, the majority (93%) were banks. A smaller but interesting portion of the targets were email providers like Yahoo and Gmail, social network and messaging apps like Facebook, Viber, and WhatsApp, and Gumtree, an Australian online classified ad app.

 

Figure 5: Marcher targets by industry
 

Most of Marcher’s domain targets are Google Play Store links where customers download the Android mobile app. In turn, most of the Google Play downloads are banking apps, but Marcher is also targeting Facebook, Viber, WhatsApp, Gmail, HTC, and Yahoo Android apps. (Yahoo, with 81 webinjects, is the biggest target outside of banks. See webinject target explanations below.) In most cases, Marcher targets a bank’s main site, mobile site, and Google Play Store Android app download collectively. (See details in Appendix A.)

 

Figure 6: Marcher domain targets by Google Play Store versus bank site directly
 

The top 5 countries whose banks were targeted included Germany, Australia, France, Turkey, and Austria. The “Global” definition applies to PayPal and eBay versus the majority of Marcher’s targets that go after specific banks in specific countries.

 

Figure 7: Targeted banks by country
 

Several banking groups were targeted across multiple countries, including the ING Group in Austria, Australia, France, and Germany; the Santander Group across Europe and Latin America; and the Sparkasse Group throughout Germany and Austria.

Target Domain Domain Owner Target Country
ingdirect.com.au ING Direct Australia
au.com.ingdirect.android ING Direct (Android App via Google Play) Australia
com.IngDirectAndroid ING Direct France (Android App via Google Play) France
banking.ing-diba.de ING-DiBa Germany
banking.ing-diba.at ING-DiBa Austria
com.ing.diba.mbbr2 ING-DiBa (Android App via Google Play) Germany
de.ing_diba.kontostand ING-DiBa Kontostand (Android App via Google Play) Germany
securebank.santander.de Santander Germany
mx.bancosantander.supermovil Santander Mexico
uk.co.santander.santanderUK Santander UK
mobile.santander.de Santander (Android App via Google Play) Germany
com.santander.app Santander (Android App via Google Play) Spain
cl.santander.smartphone Santander Chile (Android App via Google Play) Chile
ar.com.santander.rio.mbanking Santander Rio Argentina
netbanking.sparkasse.at Sparkasse Austria
m.netbanking.sparkasse.at Sparkasse Austria
com.starfinanz.smob.android.sbanking Sparkasse (Android App via Google Play) Germany
com.starfinanz.smob.android.sfinanzstatus Sparkasse (Android App via Google Play) Germany
banking.berliner-sparkasse.de Sparkasse Berliner Germany
bankingportal.sparkasse-bielefeld.de Sparkasse Bielefeld Germany
bankingportal.sparkasse-bochum.de Sparkasse Bochum Germany
bankingportal.sparkasse-dortmund.de Sparkasse Dortmund Germany
bankingportal.sparkasse-duisburg.de Sparkasse Duisburg Germany
bankingportal.frankfurter-sparkasse.de Sparkasse Frankfurter Germany
banking.sparkasse-hannover.de Sparkasse Hannover Germany
bankingportal.sparkasse-koelnbonn.de Sparkasse Koelnbonn Germany
banking.sparkasse-leipzig.de Sparkasse Leipzig Germany
banking.sparkasse-leipzig.de Sparkasse Leipzig Germany
banking.sparkasse-muensterland-ost.de Sparkasse Muensterland Germany
portal.sparkasse-nuernberg.de Sparkasse Nuernberg Germany

Table 2: Banking groups targeted across multiple countries

 

What’s also notable in terms of targets is how many webinjects the Marcher authors created for a particular banking institution. This is a direct indicator of the high priority the authors placed on certain banks. Table 3 represents the top 25 targeted URLs. These are all banks that were targeted directly (rather than their respective Android banking apps available for download in the Google Play Store).

 

Target Domain Domain Owner Target Country Target Industry Webinjects Detected
finanzportal.fiducia.de Fiducia & GAD IT Germany Banking 553
bankwest.com.au Bankwest Australia Banking 348
stgeorge.com.au St. George Australia Banking 327
ibs.bankwest.com.au Bank West Australia Banking 316
isube.garanti.com.tr Garanti Bank Turkey Banking 316
sube.halkbank.com.tr Halkbank Turkey Banking 316
www.isbank.com.tr Isbank Turkey Banking 316
banksa.com.au Bank of South Australia Australia Banking 269
westpac.com.au Westpac Australia Banking 248
ibanking.stgeorge.com.au St. George Australia Banking 237
banking.westpac.com.au Westpac Australia Banking 237
bireysel.ziraatbank.com.tr Ziraat Bank Turkey Banking 237
commbank.com.au Commonwealth Bank Australia Banking 171
fr.banquepopulaire.cyberplus Cyberplus France Banking 165
ibanking.banksa.com.au BankSA Australia Banking 158
mobile.bankaustria.at Bank Austria Austria Banking 158
banking.raiffeisen.at Raiffeisen ELBA Austria Banking 158
netbanking.sparkasse.at Sparkasse Austria Banking 158
internetsubesi.akbank.com Ak Bank Turkey Banking 158
www.isbank.com.tr/TicariInternet Isbank Turkey Banking 158
subesizbankacilik.vakifbank.com.tr Vakif Bank Turkey Banking 158
yapikredi.com.tr Yapi Kredi Turkey Banking 158
kurumsal.ziraatbank.com.tr Ziraat Bank Turkey Banking 158
ostsaechsische-sparkasse-dresden.de Ostsaechsische Sparkasse Group Germany Banking 147
de.commerzbanking.mobil Commerz Banking (Android App via Google Play) Germany Banking 147

Table 3: Top targeted banks by webinject quantity

Conclusion

Attackers know that tricking (socially engineering) general Internet users to download a fake (malicious) app or give up their credentials is much easier than targeting a bank’s network directly, so it’s no surprise when they set their sights directly on users through the services and apps they most often use, like email, social media, messaging services, eBay, and others. CISOs and users alike are advised to beware of the serious threat of Android malware campaigns. These campaigns continue to evolve by getting better at tricking user targets and evading detection. As the mobile app and device footprint grows worldwide, this poses an ever-growing threat to financial institutions having to deal with users pointing their finger at the bank when they are defrauded.

In the U.S., there have been several such finger-pointing cases over who is responsible for fraud based on stolen credentials. Even though banks have come out ahead in liability legal battles (after all, the customer got hacked, not the bank), these cases have generated a raft of negative publicity for banks.4

The blamestorming got so bad in the U.S. that financial regulators stepped in and put stronger requirements on banks to combat stolen credentials.5 Now that we’re seeing a replay of these same attacks on mobile devices, the whole cycle of anger and blame could repeat itself if we’re not careful.

From a corporate point of view, mobile devices should either be managed or untrusted. Banking attacks are easy money for cyber-criminals, but the ongoing evolution of the malware into additional applications demonstrates that nothing is safe. Because this is a challenging problem for most financial institutions, many are choosing to leverage security vendors that specialize in web and fraud protections for financial institutions, acting on their behalf to identify banking Trojans that target them and get them shut down.

About the F5 Security Operations Center

The F5 Security Operations Center (SOC) protects customers from malware, phishing, and web fraud with proactive, 24x7 real-time global threat monitoring. The efforts to identify and take down the 12 active Marcher C&C servers in March were completed by the F5 SOC.


Appendix A: Target Domain Details

No. Target Domain Domain Owner Target Country Target Industry Webinjects Detected
1 org.microemu.android.model.common.
VTUserApplicationLINKMB
Banco Link Celular (Android App via Google Play) Argentina Banking 17
2 org.banelco Banelco Mobile (Android App via Google Play) Argentina Banking 17
3 com.bbva.nxt_argentina BBVA Francés Argentina Banking 17
4 com.mosync.app_Banco_Galicia Galicia Bank (Android App via Google Play) Argentina Banking 17
5 ar.com.santander.rio.mbanking Santander Rio Argentina Banking 17
6 anz.com ANZ Australia Banking 43
7 com.anz.android ANZ goMoney (Android App via Google Play) Australia Banking 94
8 banksa.com.au Bank of South Australia Australia Banking 269
9 ibs.bankwest.com.au Bank West Australia Banking 316
10 au.com.bankwest.mobile Bank West (Android App via Google Play) Australia Banking 140
11 ibanking.banksa.com.au BankSA Australia Banking 158
12 org.banksa.bank BankSA Australia Banking 144
13 bbomobile.banksa.com.au BankSA Australia Banking 79
14 bankwest.com.au Bankwest Australia Banking 348
15 com.commbank.netbank CommBank (Android App via Google Play) Australia Banking 79
16 commbank.com.au Commonwealth Bank Australia Banking 171
17 com.commbank.netbank Commonwealth Bank Australia Banking 142
18 com.ebay.gumtree.au Gumtree (Android App via Google Play) Australia Online Classifieds 36
19 ingdirect.com.au ING Direct Australia Banking 90
20 au.com.ingdirect.android ING Direct (Android App via Google Play) Australia Banking 98
21 nab.com.au NAB Australia Banking 90
22 ib.nab.com.au NAB Australia Banking 79
23 au.com.nab.mobile NAB (Android App via Google Play) Australia Banking 98
24 my.commbank.com.au NetBank Australia Banking 79
25 stgeorge.com.au St. George Australia Banking 327
26 ibanking.stgeorge.com.au St. George Australia Banking 237
27 org.stgeorge.bank St. George Australia Banking 142
28 bbomobile.stgeorge.com.au St. George Australia Banking 79
29 westpac.com.au Westpac Australia Banking 248
30 banking.westpac.com.au Westpac Australia Banking 237
31 org.westpac.bank Westpac Australia Banking 142
32 mobile.bankaustria.at Bank Austria Austria Banking 158
33 online.bankaustria.at Bank Austria Austria Banking 79
34 com.bankaustria.android.olb Bank Austria via (Android App via Google Play) Austria Banking 133
35 at.bawag.mbanking BAWAG P.S.K. Austria Banking 133
36 ebanking.bawagpsk.com BAWAG P.S.K. Austria Banking 79
37 ebanking.easybank.at Easybank Austria Banking 79
38 at.easybank.mbanking Easybank (Android App via Google Play) Austria Banking 133
39 at.spardat.netbanking ErsteBank (Sparkasse) via (Android App via Google Play) Austria Banking 133
40 banking.ing-diba.at ING-DiBa Austria Banking 79
41 com.isis_papyrus.raiffeisen_pay_eyewdg Raiffeisen Austria Banking 103
42 banking.raiffeisen.at Raiffeisen ELBA Austria Banking 158
43 netbanking.sparkasse.at Sparkasse Austria Banking 158
44 m.netbanking.sparkasse.at Sparkasse Austria Banking 79
45 at.volksbank.volksbankmobile Volksbank (Android App via Google Play) Austria Banking 133
46 br.com.bb.android Banco do Brazil (Android App via Google Play) Brazil Banking 17
47 cl.santander.smartphone Santander Chile (Android App via Google Play) Chile Banking 17
48 com.grupoavalav1.bancamovil AV Villas (Android App via Google Play) Colombia Banking 17
49 com.bancodebogota.bancamovil Banco de Bogota (Android App via Google Play) Colombia Banking 17
50 com.todo1.mobile Bancolombia (Android App via Google Play) Colombia Banking 17
51 com.bancomer.mbanking Bancomer (Android App via Google Play) Colombia Banking 17
52 se.accumulate.me.core.androidclient.csb Bancoomeva (Android App via Google Play) Colombia Banking 17
53 co.com.bbva.mb BBVA Colombia (Android App via Google Play) Colombia Banking 17
54 com.todo1.davivienda.mobileapp Davivienda (Android App via Google Play) Colombia Banking 17
55 cz.csob.smartbanking Smart Banking App by CSOB Czech Replubic Banking 2
56 com.caisseepargne.android.mobilebanking Banque (Android App via Google Play) France Banking 128
57 net.bnpparibas.mescomptes BNP Paribas France Banking 86
58 com.boursorama.android.clients Boursorama Bank (Android App via Google Play) France Banking 83
59 com.cacf.MonCACF Centre France (Android App via APK Files.org) France Banking 79
60 com.cic_prod.bad CIC (Android App via Google Play) France Banking 86
61 com.ocito.cdn.activity.creditdunord Crédit du Nord (Android App via Google Play) France Banking 83
62 com.cm_prod.bad Crédit Mutuel (Android App via Google Play) France Banking 83
63 com.arkea.android.application.cmso2 Crédit Mutuel Arkéa (Android App via ApkMonk) France Banking 79
64 com.arkea.android.application.cmb Crédit Mutuel de Bretagne (Android App via Google Play) France Banking 79
65 fr.banquepopulaire.cyberplus Cyberplus France Banking 165
66 fr.banquepopulaire.cyberplus.pro Cyberplus France Banking 79
67 fr.lemonway.groupama Gbanque (Android App via ApkMonk) France Banking 79
68 com.groupama.toujoursla Groupama toujours là (Android App via Google Play) France Banking 83
69 com.IngDirectAndroid ING Direct France (Android App via Google Play) France Banking 84
70 com.fullsix.android.labanquepostale.
accountaccess
La Banque Postale  (Android App via Google Play) France Banking 86
71 mobi.societegenerale.mobile.lappli L'Appli Société Générale (Android App via Google Play) France Banking 86
72 fr.creditagricole.androidapp Ma Banque (Android App via Google Play) France Banking 90
73 com.macif.mobile.application.android MACIF Assurance (Android App via Google Play) France Banking 83
74 com.lbp.peps Mes Paiements (Android App via Google Play & ApkMonk) France Banking 79
75 fr.axa.monaxa Mon AXA (Android App via Google Play) France Banking 83
76 fr.lcl.android.customerarea Pro & Entreprises LCL (Android App via Google Play) France Banking 86
77 de.comdirect.android Comdirect  (Android App via Google Play) Germany Banking 104
78 de.commerzbanking.mobil Commerz Banking (Android App via Google Play) Germany Banking 147
79 kunden.commerzbank.de Commerzbank Germany Banking 79
80 de.consorsbank Der Consorsbank Germany Banking 146
81 de.dkb.portalapp DKB-Banking (Android App via Google Play) Germany Banking 104
82 com.starfinanz.mobile.android.dkbpushtan DKB-TAN2go (Android App via Google Play) Germany Banking 100
83 finanzportal.fiducia.de Fiducia & GAD IT Germany Banking 553
84 banking.ing-diba.de ING-DiBa Germany Banking 79
85 com.ing.diba.mbbr2 ING-DiBa (Android App via Google Play) Germany Banking 105
86 de.ing_diba.kontostand ING-DiBa Kontostand (Android App via Google Play) Germany Banking 101
87 com.db.mm.deutschebank Meine Bank (Android App via Google Play) Germany Banking 146
88 de.adesso.mobile.android.gad Online-Filiale (Android App via Google Play) Germany Banking 102
89 ostsaechsische-sparkasse-dresden.de Ostsaechsische Sparkasse Group Germany Banking 147
90 banking.postbank.de Postbank Germany Banking 79
91 de.postbank.finanzassistent Postbank Finanzassistent (Android App via Google Play) Germany Banking 147
92 securebank.santander.de Santander Germany Banking 79
93 mobile.santander.de Santander (Android App via Google Play) Germany Banking 104
94 com.starfinanz.smob.android.sbanking Sparkasse (Android App via Google Play) Germany Banking 147
95 com.starfinanz.smob.android.sfinanzstatus Sparkasse (Android App via Google Play) Germany Banking 105
96 banking.berliner-sparkasse.de Sparkasse Berliner Germany Banking 79
97 bankingportal.sparkasse-bielefeld.de Sparkasse Bielefeld Germany Banking 79
98 bankingportal.sparkasse-bochum.de Sparkasse Bochum Germany Banking 79
99 bankingportal.sparkasse-dortmund.de Sparkasse Dortmund Germany Banking 79
100 bankingportal.sparkasse-duisburg.de Sparkasse Duisburg Germany Banking 79
101 bankingportal.frankfurter-sparkasse.de Sparkasse Frankfurter Germany Banking 79
102 banking.sparkasse-hannover.de Sparkasse Hannover Germany Banking 79
103 bankingportal.sparkasse-koelnbonn.de Sparkasse Koelnbonn Germany Banking 79
104 banking.sparkasse-leipzig.de Sparkasse Leipzig Germany Banking 79
105 banking.sparkasse-leipzig.de Sparkasse Leipzig Germany Banking 79
106 banking.sparkasse-muensterland-ost.de Sparkasse Muensterland Germany Banking 79
107 portal.sparkasse-nuernberg.de Sparkasse Nuernberg Germany Banking 79
108 bankingportal.sparkasse-wuppertal.de Stadtsparkasse Wuppertal Germany Banking 79
109 de.fiducia.smartphone.android.banking.vr VR Banking (Android App via Google Play) Germany Banking 147
110 com.android.vending Android Google Play Store processing Global Mobile Platform 3
111 m.ebay.com eBay Global Online Auction 43
112 com.facebook.katana Facebook (Android App via Google Play) Global Social / Messaging 8
113 com.google.android.email Gmail (Android App via Google Play) Global eMail 30
114 com.google.android.gm Google (Android Dev API) Global eMail 81
115 com.htc.android.mail HTC (Android App via Google Play) Global eMail 32
116 com.android.email Mail.com Global eMail 95
117 paypal.com PayPal Global Payment Processor 88
118 com.paypal.android.p2pmobile PayPal (Android App via Google Play) Global Payment Processor 94
119 com.viber.voip Viber Messenger (Android App via Google Play) Global Social / Messaging 3
120 com.whatsapp WhatsApp (Android App via Google Play) Global Social / Messaging 3
121 com.yahoo.mobile.client.android.mail Yahoo (Android App via Google Play) Global eMail provider 81
122 com.bapro.movil Banco Provincia (Android App via Google Play) Mexico Banking 17
123 com.citibanamex.banamexmobile Citibanamex Móvil (Android App via Google Play) Mexico Banking 17
124 mx.bancosantander.supermovil Santander Mexico Banking 17
125 com.bbva.nxt_peru BBVA Continental - Banca Móvil (Android App via Google Play) Peru Banking 17
126 com.bcp.bank.bcp BCP Bank Peru Banking 17
127 pe.com.interbank.mobilebanking Interbank APP (Android App via Google Play) Peru Banking 17
128 wit.android.bcpBankingApp.millenniumPL Bank Millennium (Android App via Google Play) Poland Banking 47
129 eu.eleader.mobilebanking.pekao Bank Pekao (Android App via Google Play) Poland Banking 147
130 pl.eurobank Euro Bank Poland Banking 47
131 com.getingroup.mobilebanking Getin Noble Bank (Android App via ApkMonk) Poland Banking 47
132 pl.mbank mBank Poland Banking 52
133 eu.eleader.mobilebanking.raiffeisen Mobile Bank (Android App via Google Play) Poland Banking 47
134 com.santander.app Santander (Android App via Google Play) Spain Banking 17
135 se.accumulate.me.core.
androidclient.occidente
Banco de Occidente B.P (Android App via Google Play) Sweden Banking 31
136 internetsubesi.akbank.com Ak Bank Turkey Banking 158
137 mobilsube.akbank.com.tr Ak Bank Direkt Turkey Banking 79
138 com.akbank.android.apps.akbank_direkt Ak Bank Direkt (Android App via Google Play) Turkey Banking 126
139 com.garanti.cepsubesi Garanti (Android App via Google Play) Turkey Banking 84
140 isube.garanti.com.tr Garanti Bank Turkey Banking 316
141 isube.garanti.com.tr Garanti Bank Turkey Banking 79
142 com.tmobtech.halkbank Halkbank (Android App via Google Play) Turkey Banking 126
143 sube.halkbank.com.tr Halkbank Bank Turkey Banking 316
144 www.isbank.com.tr/TicariInternet Isbank Turkey Banking 158
145 www.isbank.com.tr Isbank Bank Turkey Banking 316
146 com.pozitron.iscep İşCep (Android App via Google Play) Turkey Banking 84
147 internetsubesi.finansbank.com.tr QNB Finansbank Turkey Banking 79
148 com.finansbank.mobile.cepsube QNB Finasbank (Android App via Google Play) Turkey Banking 126
149 subesizbankacilik.vakifbank.com.tr Vakif Bank Turkey Banking 158
150 com.vakifbank.mobile Vakif Bank (Android App via Google Play) Turkey Banking 126
151 yapikredi.com.tr Yapi Kredi Turkey Banking 158
152 com.ykb.android Yapi Kredi (Android App via Google Play) Turkey Banking 84
153 bireysel.ziraatbank.com.tr Ziraat Bank Turkey Banking 237
154 kurumsal.ziraatbank.com.tr Ziraat Bank Turkey Banking 158
155 com.ziraat.ziraatmobil Ziraat Mobil (Android App via Google Play) Turkey Banking 84
156 com.grppl.android.shell.BOS Bank of Scotland  (Android App via Google Play) UK Banking 8
157 com.barclays.android.barclaysmobilebanking Barclays (Android App via Google Play) UK Banking 6
158 halifax-online.co.uk Halifax UK UK Banking 79
159 com.grppl.android.shell.halifax Halifax UK (Android App via Google Play) UK Banking 89
160 com.htsu.hsbcpersonalbanking HSBC (Android App via Google Play) UK Banking 8
161 online.lloydsbank.co.uk Lloyds Bank UK Banking 79
162 com.grppl.android.shell.CMBlloydsTSB73 Lloyds Bank (Android App via Google Play) UK Banking 89
163 com.rbs.mobile.android.natwest NatWest (Android App via Google Play) UK Banking 6
164 com.rbs.mobile.android.rbs Royal Bank (Android App via Google Play) UK Banking 6
165 uk.co.santander.santanderUK Santander UK Banking 6
166 online.tsb.co.uk TSB UK Banking 79
167 uk.co.tsb.mobilebank TSB (Android App via Google Play) UK Banking 89
168 com.rbs.mobile.android.ubr Ulster Bank (Android App via Google Play) UK Banking 6
169 com.paybybank.westernunion Paybybank US Banking 30
170 om.suntrust.mobilebanking SunTrust US Banking 32
171 com.tdbank TD Bank US Banking 32
172 com.unionbank.ecommerce.mobile.android Union Bank US Banking 32

 

Appendix B: Samples Tested

6e96b1d9628e7ee8378d15d507c64cfa7bbb85ad64793adaf610c8bc70808b0f

2327d19badd8632930079efb55f5603644f4b077b47439d2bdf11a233dadece2

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2181f303b09f7ece1a5b81563a4d19282b1b438887f033fd294f57b7c653402a

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Authors & Contributors
Doron Voolf (Author)
Malware Analyst
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