Top Risks

Regional Threat Perspectives: Europe

Attackers are using IP addresses in the Netherlands, United States, and China to target systems in Europe over SIP, Microsoft SMB, and SSH.
April 17, 2019
9 min. read

F5 Labs, in conjunction with our partner Baffin Bay Networks, set out to research the global attack landscape to get a better understanding of the threat landscape across multiple regions, identify consistencies in attackers and targeted ports, and discover what was unique in each region. In this research series we look at attacks over the same 90-day period in Europe, the United States, Canada, and Australia. This article covers attack traffic destined for European IP addresses from December 1, 2018 through March 1, 2019, and how it compares to the other regions.

  • The majority of attacks against Europe came from IP addresses in the Netherlands, followed by the United States, China, Russia, and France (in that order).
  • The networks of the top attacking IP addresses were used to target destinations all over the globe. However, the IP addresses used in the attacks against European destinations were not seen attacking other regions in the same period.
  • The top attacked ports were 5060 for SIP, 445 for Microsoft Server Message Block (SMB), and 2222 for non-standard SSH access—very similar to what we saw in Australia and Canada.
  • Europe received more attacks from within its own geographic region than any other region.

Top Attacking Countries

Systems deployed in Europe are targeted by IPs all over the world. Looking at the source countries of attacks by region on a global heatmap, the source countries of European attacks are very similar to source countries of attacks against Australia and Canada. The US receives far fewer attacks from European IPs than Europe, Canada, or Australia does.

Figure 1. Source countries of attacks targeting Europe
Figure 1. Source countries of attacks targeting Europe.

The Netherlands was the top source traffic country of attacks against European systems from Dec 1, 2018 through March 1, 2019. IPs in the Netherlands launched 1.5 times more attacks against European systems than IPs in the US or China, and 6 times more attacks than IPs in Indonesia in the tenth position.

Figure 2. Top Attacking Countries by Count
Figure 2. Top Attacking Countries by Count

Top Attacking Networks (ASNs)

The Netherlands-based network of HostPalace Web Solutions (ASN 133229) launched the largest number of attacks destined for European IP addresses, followed by France’s Online SAS (ASN 12876), and NForce Entertainment (ASN 43350), also from the Netherlands. All three of these companies are web hosting providers whose networks routinely show up in our top threat actor networks lists.

To get a sense of attack volume by ASN, Figure 2 shows the top 25 ASNs in ranking order of attack count.

Figure 3. Top 25 Attacking ASNs by attack count
Figure 3. Top 25 Attacking ASNs by attack count

The following table shows the top 50 attacking ASNs in order of highest to lowest number of attacks. Seventy-two percent of these ASNs are Internet service providers, 28% are web hosting providers.

ASN ASN Organization Country Industry
133229 HostPalace Web Solution PVT LTD Netherlands Hosting
2876 Online S.a.s. France Hosting
43350 NForce Entertainment B.V. Netherlands ISP
16276 OVH SAS France Hosting
36352 ColoCrossing United States ISP
4134 Chinanet China ISP
50113 MediaServicePlus LLC Russia ISP
56005 Henan Telcom Union Technology Co., LTD China Hosting
45899 VNPT Corp Vietnam ISP
17974 PT Telekomunikasi Indonesia Indonesia ISP
4837 CNCGROUP China169 Backbone China ISP
44244 Iran Cell Service and Communication Company Iran ISP
3462 Data Communication Business Group Taiwan ISP
7552 Viettel Corporation Vietnam ISP
197207 Mobile Communication Company of Iran PLC Iran ISP
58271 FOP Gubina Lubov Petrivna Ukraine Hosting
8048 CANTV Servicios Venuzuela ISP
4766 Korea Telecom South Korea ISP
12880 Information Technology Company (ITC) Iran ISP
18403 The Corporation for Financing & Promoting Tech... Vietnam ISP
6739 Vodafone Ono, S.A. Spain ISP
45090 Shenzhen Tencent Computer Systems Company Limited China ISP
9121 Turk Telekom Turkey ISP
206792 IP Khnykin Vitaliy Yakovlevich Russia ISP
23650 CHINANET jiangsu province backbone China ISP
9829 National Internet Backbone India ISP
31549 Aria Shatel Company Ltd Iran ISP
8151 Uninet S.A. de C.V. Mexico ISP
49877 RM Engineering LLC Russia Hosting
12389 PJSC Rostelecom Russia ISP
9299 Philippine Long-Distance Telephone Company Philippines ISP
4812 China Telecom (Group) China ISP
4808 China Unicom Beijing Province Network China ISP
8452 TE Data Norway ISP
16125 UAB Cherry Servers Lithuania Hosting
29073 Quasi Networks LTD. Netherlands Hosting
60999 Libatech SAL Lebanon ISP
31034 Aruba S.p.A. Italy Hosting
9498 BHARTI Airtel Ltd. India ISP
7922 Comcast Cable Communications, LLC United States ISP
44050 Petersburg Internet Network ltd. Russia ISP
60781 LeaseWeb Netherlands B.V. Netherlands Hosting
42590 Telemost LLC Ukraine Hosting
393406 Digital Ocean, Inc. United States Hosting
43754 Asiatech Data Transfer Inc PLC Iran Hosting
23969 TOT Public Company Limited Thailand ISP
18881 TELEFÔNICA BRASIL S.A Brazil ISP
16509 Amazon.com, Inc. United States Hosting
55577 Atria Convergence Technologies pvt ltd India ISP
4230 CLARO S.A. Brazil ISP


Note that Quasi Networks (ASN 29073), a known bulletproof hosting provider that did not respond to abuse complaints, has been “unassigned” as of March 24, 2019.

Top Attacking IP Addresses

Whereas we see consistency in the networks being used to launch attacks, the IP addresses used to target systems in Europe were unique, with the exception of 62.210.83.136 and 46.166.151.117. This can indicate that attackers are using specific (hosting) networks from which they know they can successfully launch attacks (and spinning up new systems or getting dynamic IPs from which to launch attacks), or they are exploiting vulnerabilities in systems resolving to ISPs, like residential or commercial IoT devices, and keep using new systems. Both scenarios result in new IPs from the same networks.  The chart in Figure 4 shows the top 50 IP addresses attacking destinations in Europe from Dec 1, 2018 through March 1, 2019.

Figure 4. Top 50 attacking IPs
Figure 4. Top 50 attacking IPs

Organizations should check their network logs for connections from these IP addresses, and the owning networks should investigate these IP addresses for abuse.

Source IP ASN Organization ASN ISP Country
23.249.175.100 ColoCrossing 36352 Net3 United States
42.51.231.67 Henan Telcom Union Technology Co., LTD 56005 CNISP-Union Technology (Beijing) Co. China
194.63.142.249 MediaServicePlus LLC 50113 MediaServicePlus LLC Russia
37.49.231.160 HostPalace Web Solution PVT LTD 133229 Estro Web Services Private Limited Netherlands
37.49.231.132 HostPalace Web Solution PVT LTD 133229 Estro Web Services Private Limited Netherlands
62.210.84.142 Online S.a.s. 12876 Free SAS France
185.53.88.46 Vitox Telecom 209299   Estonia
185.254.122.17 UGB Hosting OU 206485   Russia
37.49.231.188 HostPalace Web Solution PVT LTD 133229 Estro Web Services Private Limited Netherlands
167.114.1.144 OVH SAS 16276 OVH Hosting Canada
185.40.4.42 MediaServicePlus LLC 50113 MediaServicePlus LLC Russia
62.210.83.56 Online S.a.s. 12876 Free SAS France
167.114.208.173 OVH SAS 16276 OVH Hosting Canada
37.49.231.187 HostPalace Web Solution PVT LTD 133229 Estro Web Services Private Limited Netherlands
62.210.86.106 Online S.a.s. 12876 Free SAS France
62.210.86.117 Online S.a.s. 12876 Free SAS France
62.210.88.58 Online S.a.s. 12876 Free SAS France
62.210.83.104 Online S.a.s. 12876 Free SAS France
37.49.231.236 HostPalace Web Solution PVT LTD 133229 Estro Web Services Private Limited Netherlands
37.49.231.122 HostPalace Web Solution PVT LTD 133229 Estro Web Services Private Limited Netherlands
62.210.83.136 Online S.a.s. 12876 Free SAS France
176.119.7.170 FOP Gubina Lubov Petrivna 58271 FOP Gubina Lubov Petrivna Ukraine
216.170.120.176 ColoCrossing 36352 Net3 United States
185.107.83.129 NForce Entertainment B.V. 43350 NFOrce Entertainment B.V. Netherlands
185.107.80.62 NForce Entertainment B.V. 43350 NFOrce Entertainment B.V. Netherlands
185.107.80.153 NForce Entertainment B.V. 43350 NFOrce Entertainment B.V. Netherlands
46.166.142.35 NForce Entertainment B.V. 43350 NFOrce Entertainment B.V. Netherlands
192.227.220.213 ColoCrossing 36352 ColoCrossing United States
46.166.187.179 NForce Entertainment B.V. 43350 NFOrce Entertainment B.V. Netherlands
185.107.80.31 NForce Entertainment B.V. 43350 NFOrce Entertainment B.V. Netherlands
46.166.187.2 NForce Entertainment B.V. 43350 NFOrce Entertainment B.V. Netherlands
210.124.164.133 Korea Telecom 4766 LG DACOM Corporation Republic of Korea
46.166.139.6 NForce Entertainment B.V. 43350 NFOrce Entertainment B.V. Netherlands
167.114.174.232 OVH SAS 16276 OVH Hosting Canada
46.166.187.4 NForce Entertainment B.V. 43350 NFOrce Entertainment B.V. Netherlands
185.53.88.71 Vitox Telecom 209299   Estonia
62.210.84.176 Online S.a.s. 12876 Free SAS France
46.166.148.3 NForce Entertainment B.V. 43350 NFOrce Entertainment B.V. Netherlands
149.56.45.214 OVH SAS 16276 OVH Hosting Canada
62.210.86.103 Online S.a.s. 12876 Free SAS France
37.49.231.77 HostPalace Web Solution PVT LTD 133229 Estro Web Services Private Limited Netherlands
46.166.142.27 NForce Entertainment B.V. 43350 NFOrce Entertainment B.V. Netherlands
46.166.187.177 NForce Entertainment B.V. 43350 NFOrce Entertainment B.V. Netherlands
137.74.180.145 OVH SAS 16276 OVH SAS France
178.215.173.22 Telemost LLC 42590 Telemost LLC Ukraine
37.49.231.159 HostPalace Web Solution PVT LTD 133229 Estro Web Services Private Limited Netherlands
62.210.142.89 Online S.a.s. 12876 Free SAS France
62.210.84.136 Online S.a.s. 12876 Free SAS France
46.166.151.117 NForce Entertainment B.V. 43350 NFOrce Entertainment B.V. Netherlands
62.210.84.153 Online S.a.s. 12876 Free SAS France


Top Targeted Ports

Looking at the targeted ports gives us a sense of the types of systems the attackers are after. In Europe, the top attacked port was 5060, used by the SIP service for VoIP connectivity to phones and video conferencing systems. This is routinely a top attacked port when looking at attack traffic against a specific location during global dignitary events, such as when President Trump met with Kim Jung Un in Singapore in 2018 and with Vladimir Putin in Helsinki in 2018. The second most-attacked port in Europe is Microsoft SMB port 445, followed by port 2222, which is commonly used as a non-standard SSH port, but is also used by Industrial Control Systems.

Figure 5. Top 20 attacked ports and services
Figure 5. Top 20 attacked ports and services

Conclusion

Organizations should continually run external vulnerability scans to discover what systems are exposed publicly, and on which specific ports. Any systems exposed publicly with the top attacked ports open should be prioritized for vulnerability management. A lot of the attacks we see on ports supporting access services like SSH are brute force, so any public login page should have adequate brute force protections in place. Database ports like 1433 and 3306, which should not be exposed publicly, are top attacked ports. Organizations should do their best to protect databases and not expose them directly to the Internet. Furthermore, logs should be reviewed for any top attacking IP matches. If you are experiencing attacks from any of these top IP addresses, you should submit abuse complaints to the owners of the ASNs and ISPs so they can shut down the attacking systems.

For those interested in IP blocking, it can be troublesome not only to maintain large IP blocklists, but also to block IP addresses within ISPs that offer Internet service to residences that might be customers. In these cases, the attacking system is likely to be an infected IoT device that the resident doesn’t know is infected, and it likely won’t get cleaned up. Blocking traffic from entire ASNs or an entire ISP can be problematic for the same reason—blocking their entire network would block all of their customers from doing business with you. Unless of course it’s an ISP supporting a country you don’t do business with. In that case, geolocation blocking at a country level can be effective way to reduce a large amount of attack traffic and save your systems the unnecessary processing. For this reason, it is best to drop traffic based on the attack pattern on your network and web application firewalls.

We will continue to monitor global attacks and analyze at a regional level quarterly, and include the Asia-Pacific, Middle East and North Africa, and Latin American regions moving forward. If you are an implicated ASN or ISP, please reach out to us at F5LabsTeam@F5.com and we’ll be happy to share further information with you.

Technical
Preventative
  • Organizations exposing commonly attacked ports publicly to the internet, especially systems that shouldn’t be accessible over the internet like databases, should do their best to restrict public accessibility through their firewall.
  • Any commonly attacked ports that require external access, like HTTP and SSH, should be prioritized for vulnerability management.
Administrative
Preventative
  • Organizations should look to implement geo IP blocking of commonly attacking countries that the business does not have a need to communicate with.
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Authors & Contributors
Sara Boddy (Author)

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